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40TH ANNIVERSARY OF MALAYSIA-CHINA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
Professor Yan Xuetong is known for his 
wide-ranging studies of Chinese foreign 
policy and international relations. He has 
been known to pioneer some of the main 
foreign policy ideas in China. Recently 
Professor Yan received a lot of attention 
for the innovative application of ancient 
Chinese political thought on modern 
international relations.  
In this public lecture on 2 June 2014, 
Professor Yan discusses how ancient 
Chinese political thinking on international 
relations, which can be roughly classified 
into “humane authority,” “hegemony” and 
“tyranny,” can serve as analytical lens for 
us to understand and explain foreign 
policy behavior of the major powers in 
the world. For Professor Yan, China 
should adopt the “humane authority” 
approach, such authority relies much on 
the Confucianist concept of benevolence 
and expounds the principle of fairness, in 
contrast to the principle of equality that 
underlies in the international 
r e l a t i o n s .  A l t h o u g h  h e 
acknowledges that Chinese foreign 
policy behavior has not yet reached 
the ideal of “humane authority,” he 
nevertheless is confident that future 
Chinese foreign policy behavior will 
increasingly take such into account.  
In addition, Professor Yan also 
illuminates on some of the difficult 
foreign policy choices that China 
has to make in recent years, among 
which is how China has to balance 
its own national interest and its 
obligation to the international 
community. ◆ 
ICS Public Lecture Series II 
Humane Authority and China’s Sub-Regional Integration 
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On 20 May 2014, the Institute of China Studies, together 
with the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs, Wisma 
Putra and Malaysia-China Friendship Association, organized 
a public seminar on Malaysia-China Relations in conjunction 
with the 40th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between 
Malaysia and China. The Seminar was divided into two 
parts. In the first part, former Malaysian diplomats with 
extensive experience interacting with China spoke about 
their experience and shared their insights with others. Dato' 
Khor Eng Hee, who had served as Malaysia's ambassador 
to Brazil, was in early 1970s an undersecretary as Wisma 
Putra. He recalled how he was approached by the then 
Prime Minister Tun Razak to prepare for the 
establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China. Tan Sri Michael Chen, the 
renowned politician and a former leader of the 
Malaysian Chinese Association, shared with the 
audience his role in communicating the desire to 
establish ties with China through the ping-pong 
diplomacy in 1972. Dato' Abdul Majid Khan, former 
ambassador to China and the current president of the 
Malaysia-China Friendship Association, discussed 
Malaysia-China relations through the lens of a former 
diplomat who is now actively engaged in public and 
people-to-people diplomacy. 
In the second part of the seminar, academics discuss 
the challenges and opportunities underlying the present 
Malaysia-China relations. Professors Cheong Kee 
Cheok and Lee Poh Ping of the University of Malaya 
discussed the historical background as well as the 
present economic ties that serve as the solid foundation 
of this bilateral relationship. Dr. Li Mingjiang of Nanyang 
Technological University illuminated the complex 
situation in the South China Sea and China's foreign 
policy behavior toward the region. Dr. Ngeow Chow 
Bing of the University of Malaya explored the defense 
aspect of the bilateral relations, reviewing the past 
interactions in this aspect and discussing the future 
possibilities.  ◆ 
A leading western scholar of 
Indonesian communism, Ruth McVey  wrote 
in the late 1960s that China had been three 
things to Indonesia, a state; a revolution; 
and an ethnic minorityi. It took some time 
before the Indonesians could separate the 
three even if the linkages might still persist 
in some quarters. The same can be said of 
the situation in Malaysia. Ever since 
independence in 1957, the linkage of China 
with the insurgency of the Communist Party 
of Malaya (CPM) and with the loyalty of 
some of the Malaysian Chinese population 
has existed in the eyes of the Malaysian 
authorities and the wider Malay population. 
Thus Malaysian policy towards China for 
some part of the forty years since Razak 
visited China in 1974, had been greatly 
influenced by the support of China for the 
insurgency and by worries on the part of the 
Malaysia government of the hold the 
Chinese state could exert on the Malaysian 
Chinese population. However, communist 
subversion became irrelevant as a factor in 
the bilateral relations with the laying down of 
arms by the CPM in 1989. The authorities 
also became more confident of the 
integration of the Malaysian Chinese into the 
Malaysian polity with passage of time. So 
much so that in the early 1990s, the 
Malaysian government, influenced by the 
prospect of a growing Chinese market, 
removed restrictions of Malaysians travelling 
to China. Thus what can be called normal 
state to state relations developed. 
 
 The Revolutionary Factor  
 
When Razak , in pursuit of a policy of 
neutrality for Malaysia , took advantage of 
the thaw in Sino-American relations brought 
about by Nixon's visit to China in 1972, to 
visit China in 1974, he established full 
diplomatic relations with China. But normal 
state-to-state relations did not develop. 
China insisted on the continuation of 
relations between the Chinese communist 
party and the banned CPM. China then was 
still under Mao and the revolutionary fervour 
had yet to die down. Moreover the Sino-
Soviet ideological dispute was still on. Thus 
China could not simply abandon the CPM. 
China wanted the two relationships to be 
kept separate but Malaysia could not accept 
this. Malaysia argued that the party 
controlled the government in China and thus 
in essence both were fundamentally the 
same. It follows that it was not right that the 
Chinese state should recognize, if only 
indirectly, a party that was banned in 
Malaysia. Thus mutual suspicion and a 
strained atmosphere marked the bilateral 
relations. But when Deng came into power, 
the revolutionary fervour in China had largely 
dissipated and China's integration into the 
world economy rendered the Sino-Soviet 
ideological dispute irrelevant. And in his wish 
to cultivate good relations with the ASEAN 
states, Deng put pressure on the CPM to 
abandon the struggle which the CPM did in 
1989.Thus the CPM faded into oblivion and 
no longer bedeviled relations between the 
Chinese state and the Malaysian state.  
 
The Ethnic Factor 
 
When the Chinese communist party took 
power in 1949 in China they continued the 
Kuomintang policy of recognizing as Chinese 
citizens in Southeast Asia anyone who had a 
grandfather who was Chinese. The 
communists discovered however that this did 
not sit well with the independent 
governments of Southeast Asia. They then 
decided on a policy that they would be willing 
to settle the issue of these overseas Chinese 
with Southeast Asian governments that 
would accord recognition to China. The first 
to do so was Indonesia in 1956 when a Sino-
Indonesian Dual Nationality was signed. 
Chinese Indonesians who qualified could be 
considered for Indonesian citizenship and 
the others were urged to respect Indonesian 
laws and customs. When Razak visited 
China in 1974 most of the Chinese in 
Malaysia had become Malaysian citizens 
except for an estimated 200,000 stateless 
Chinese who could not or would not become 
Malaysian citizens. But so keen were both 
sides on establishing relations that they 
decided to put aside this problem. The 
stateless Chinese, like their Indonesian 
counterparts, were urged to respect 
Malaysian laws and customs. Since then the 
long domicile of the Chinese in Malaysia and 
their acceptance of Malaysia as their 
homeland have led many Malays to delink 
the Malaysian Chinese from China even if 
some suspicions of this linkage  still remain. 
Though one cannot discount the possibility 
of future geopolitical developments bringing 
these suspicions to the fore, the trend is 
nevertheless towards delinkage. 
 
 It is possible now to consider Malaysian 
bilateral relations with China largely free of 
these two issues and focus on one of the 
A Review of Malaysia-China Relations since 1974: Revolutionary and 
Ethnic factors and the Rise of China -  by Dr Lee Poh Ping 
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most important, if not the most important 
issue now affecting both states, and that is 
how Malaysia views the rise of China. 
 
Rise of China 
 
When China opened its doors in the late 
1970s to the international capitalist system, it 
was generally welcomed by the West and 
Japan. The multinationals saw this as an 
opportunity to take advantage of Chinese 
labour and market, and basically to control 
the direction of the Chinese economy. But 
because China has proved to be so 
adaptable to the international market system 
and has begun to register a spectacular and 
sustained rate of growth, an average of 
about 10 percent each year since 1980, that 
there is much speculation that it  will 
overtake the US economy in the not too 
distant future. Talk of a Chinese threat both 
to the international economic and ultimately 
the general world order began to arise. While 
not all circles in the west subscribe to this 
China threat theory there is enough of this 
going on to put pressure on many countries 
to take some kind of a stand. 
 
Malaysia on its part does not subscribe to 
this China threat theory. It has made it 
abundantly clear that it does not consider 
China as a threat and will not be party to any 
attempt to contain China. Malaysia’s position 
arises from three sources. One is what can 
be called the ‘be careful what you wish for’ 
school, that is, if you wish for something you 
might get it though it may not necessarily be 
to your benefit. And that could apply to 
China. Malaysia is very concerned that if one 
believes China is a threat it could in reality 
turned out to be one. Hence it is better not to 
consider it so. 
 
The second is one of the interpretations of 
history. Many Malaysian leaders have stated 
that China had no history of the colonization 
of Southeast Asia even when it was very 
strong as during the Ming period. This is 
unlike the western countries which during 
their move into Southeast Asia in the last few 
centuries have colonized almost all of 
Southeast Asia. 
 
Lastly, Malaysia sees a tremendous 
potential in taking advantage of a Chinese 
economy that has grown into the second 
largest in the world. It has established a 
huge trading relationship with China so much 
so that it is China's largest trading partner in 
ASEAN while China has become Malaysia's 
largest trading country. Malaysia also sees 
huge Chinese investment and tourism 
potential. One cannot view as a threat a 
country one has developed extensive 
economic relations with. 
 
There is however one issue that could 
change this benign Malaysian perception of 
China. This is concerning the disputed 
claims over the South China Seas. China 
claims all the area included in a so called 9-
dash line that covers almost the whole of the 
South China Sea. China bases its claim in 
great part on its reading of history. Malaysia 
on the other hand claims a part of this, that 
of the Spratly Islands. This dispute has so far 
not created acrimony between both as 
Malaysia has decided to take a low key 
approach, the most important of which has 
been Malaysia not inviting or asking the US 
to intervene as the Philippines had done.  
 
Consequently China has not been too 
assertive, except for the recent Chinese 
incursion into the James Shoal area, and 
hence has kept the volume down. The issue 
however is not resolved. China wants to 
resolve it bilaterally. Malaysia while not 
publicly against would probably prefer a 
united ASEAN approach and one based on 
international law. So far there is talk of both 
sides abiding by a code of conduct but that 
has not been agreed upon as yet. What has 
been agreed upon is the Declaration of a 
code of conduct, something which signifies 
intention rather than the implementation of 
actual rules. If actual conflict breaks out 
between both over the Spratlys dispute then 
China will be perceived as a threat.  ◆ 
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Prime Minister Najib Razak (left) shakes 
hands with China’s Premier Li Keqiang 
after signing a joint document during a 
celebration to mark 40th Anniversary of 
the Establishment of Diplomatic Rela-
tionship between Malaysia and China at 
the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, 
May 31, 2014—— Reuters pic.  
 In the last two decades, Malaysia-
China relations have improved significantly. 
While economic relations have deepened, 
mutual visits by the top leaders of both 
countries have also continued, with the 
most recent ones being the October 2013 
visit by the President of China Xi Jinping to 
Malaysia and the May 2014 visit by Prime 
Minster Najib to China. However, among 
the growing ties between Malaysia and 
China, the defense relations between the 
two countries have not been receiving 
much attention and in fact have not been 
progressing as fast as other fronts. This 
short piece offers a brief review and 
analysis of the defense relations. 
 
Defense relations between Malaysia and 
China did not begin until 1992, despite the 
normalization of relations in 1974. In 1992, 
the then defense minister Dato Seri Najib 
Tun Razak visited China and began the 
process of establishing some kind of 
relations between the two militaries. Before 
that, there had been ground for suspicions, 
especially from the Malaysian side, as 
China was the major supporter of the 
communist insurgency that was waging 
violent struggle against the Malaysian 
authorities. However, the 1989 peace 
accord between the government of 
Malaysia and the Malayan Communist 
Party paved the way not only for better 
bilateral relations, but also specifically 
removed one important obstacle for both 
militaries to establish some kind of ties. 
 
Najib’s visit in 1992 was reciprocated by 
the then China’s defense minister Chi 
Haotian in 1993. In the course of 1990s, 
there were several high-level visits as well, 
including the visit by PLA Chiefs of General 
Staff Zhang Wannian in 1994 and Fu 
Quanyou in 1999. In 1995, the agreement 
to appoint defense attaché in the 
respective embassies of each other was 
fulfilled. There were also talks of possible 
collaboration in joint development of 
defense industry and exchange of 
students, but few of these discussions 
materialized in concrete actions. 
Nevertheless, such visits were important 
confidence-building measures that laid the 
foundation for possibilities of more 
cooperation in the coming years. 
 
Entering the new millennium, the high-level 
mutual visits continued. In the first decade 
of the new millennium, key defense officials 
from China, including Chief of General Staff 
Liang Guanglie, Vice-Chairman of Central 
Military Commission Guo Boxiong, Defense 
Minister Cao Gangchuan, paid visit to 
Malaysia, while Malaysia also reciprocated. 
Among these visits was the important 2005 
visit by Dato Seri Najib Tun Razak, in his 
capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and 
Defense Minister (second stint). The 2005 
visit resulted in the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding on defense 
cooperation between the militaries of both 
countries. This MoU has been seen as an 
important milestone for formalizing defense 
cooperation and providing the basic 
framework for both countries to work on. The 
MoU spells out several areas of possible 
cooperation, such as the continued high-
level mutual visits, exchange of military 
students, establishment of a defense and 
security dialogue mechanism, joint military 
exercise, among others.  
 
In the subsequent years, efforts were put to 
fulfill the cooperative agenda of the MoU, but 
with varying degree of progress. Students 
from Malaysia studying in China’s National 
Defense University and other defense-
related institutions of higher learning 
increased, while China’s students also 
started attending courses in the Staff College 
and Defense College in Malaysia, especially 
since 2009. High-level mutual visits also 
continued, with Malaysia’s Defense Ministers 
Dato Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi and Datuk 
Seri Hishammuddin Hussein visiting China in 
2011 and 2013, and the Chief of Armed 
Forces of Malaysia Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd 
Zin visiting China also in 2013. Mutual port 
calls by navy ships have also been 
increasing since 2009.  
 
However, other areas are progressing at a 
slower pace. The much anticipated defense 
and security consultation was not realized 
until 2012, seven years after the signing of 
the MoU, while the first joint military exercise 
is reportedly taking place in the second half 
of 2014. In addition, despite the talks of 
possible joint development of defense 
industry and procurement of China’s 
weapons by Malaysia stretching as far back 
as to the 1990s, not much has come 
forward. In 2009, the Ministry of Defense of 
Malaysia confirmed that Malaysia had 
procured from China several sets of short 
range FN-6 shoulder-launched surface-to-air 
missile, in a deal worth about RM23 million. 
Defense Relations between Malaysia and China -  By Dr Ngeow Chow Bing 
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countries have not 
been receiving much 
attention and in fact 
have not been 
progressing as fast 
as other fronts. 
This procurement remains the only 
confirmed case of procuring Chinese 
weaponry by Malaysia. In 2014, during 
Prime Minister Najib’s visit to China, an 
MoU, between Aneka Bekal Sdn Bhd and 
Aerospace Long-March International Trade 
Co Ltd, was signed in which the latter is to 
offer the LY-80 Medium-Range-Air-Defence 
Missile Weapon System bundled with 
transfer of technology. If materialized, this 
would be another milestone.  
 
Reviewing the past developments of 
Malaysia-China defense relations, one can 
sense that the progress indeed has not been 
spectacular as is the case in other fronts, 
such as trade. There seems to be a lot of 
cautiousness in moving the defense relations 
ahead. Undoubtedly, the presence of the 
South China Sea dispute has been one 
significant obstacle. Compared to other 
territorial disputants with China, Malaysia 
has so far managed well to contain the 
dispute from negatively impacting the overall 
bilateral relations. However, the dispute does 
create some kind of trust deficit between the 
militaries of both countries, although such 
deficit is only slowing down, but not fully 
preventing, development of the defense ties 
between the two countries. In a sense, it also 
creates the imperative to build stronger trust 
and confidence, as witnessed by the 
frequency of mutual visits of high-level 
defense officials. Last year visit by a Chinese 
navy training ship, Zhenghe, to Sabah, the 
state that oversees the disputed area of South 
China Sea, provided the signal that Malaysia 
remains committed to engage China, even 
over sensitive issues, in the slow building up 
of defense ties. China’s Minister of Defense 
Chang Wanquan is reportedly to visit 
Malaysia in 2014, and whether his trip will 
include a visit to Sabah will be another 
important indicator. ◆ 
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Malaysian Defense Minister Dato Seri Hishamuddin Hussein and Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Chang 
Wanquan, in Beijing, October 2013.   
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Management during the time of the public lecture, is an 
acknowledged authority on ethnic politics and constitutional 
engineering. He has done extensive empirical and theoretical 
studies on the kind of institutional frameworks that make ethnic 
accommodation possible.  
In this public lecture on 26 February 2014, Professor Horowitz 
illuminates on the two main approaches to ethnic power 
sharing. One of these, the consociational, relies on an 
elaborate set of agreed guarantes for all ethnic groups. The 
other, the centripetal approach, rests on the creation of 
incentives for political leaders of ethnic groups to behave 
moderately toward the interests of groups other than their own. 
Both approaches aim at interethnic compromise and 
accommodation but through different methods.  On both, there 
is now enough accumulated evidence on which to base 
judgments of their relative efficacy.  For both, there are also 
questions about their adoptability and durability. Professor 
Horowitz’s main contention is that the centripetal approach 
seems to work better in creating the incentive for political 
leaders to come to accommodation. Professor Horowitz’s 
public lecture is especially relevant in the context of multiethnic 
politics in both Malaysia and China. ◆ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professor Donald Horowitz, a professor of political science 
and law at Duke University, who was also affiliated with 
the University of Malaya as an Academic Icon of the 
Institute of China Studies and Institute of Public Policy and 
ICS Public Lecture Series I 
Ethnic Power Sharing: New Perspectives 
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MALAYSIA-CHINA INVESTMENT TIES 
broad conclusion that Malaysia OFDI flows to China exceeds 
the reverse by a factor of five to eight times or even more. To 
begin to correct this imbalance, Malaysia will quickly need to 
draw in China OFDI equivalent at least to what it has received 
from Germany. Such a rapid transformation in Malaysia-China 
investment outcomes is unlikely without significant investment 
drivers (such as MCKIP) in place. However, the relative small 
size of MCKIP relative to QIP is suggestive of a continued 
imbalance in Malaysia-China foreign investments. ◆ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khor Yu Leng, an independent political economist and 
consultant, presented a seminar at the Institute of China 
Studies on 7 March 2014. Ms. Khor’s seminar examined 
the investment ties between Malaysia and China. China is 
Malaysia’s top trading partner but China’s FDI in Malaysia 
lags in relative terms. Both countries have now jointly 
established the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park 
(MCKIP) and Qinzhou Industrial Park (QIP) to further 
boost bilateral trade and investment. Investment 
promoters see Malaysia as a country for China to reach 
markets within country-of-origin rules; and the state of 
Pahang where the MCKIP is located, is likely to benefit 
from the expected investment and job creation.  Available 
data indicate a substantial imbalance in FDI flows with the 
Ms Khor Yu Leng  
 
Predicting Peaks of Collective Actions: Based on Simulations  
From Nation-state to State-nation:  
A Comparative Study on ideas of Nation-building in Modern China and 
Malaysia from the Perspective of Their Founding Fathers, Sun Yat Sen 
and Tunku Abdul Rahman Respectively 
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This seminar was presented by Dr. Chin Chong Foh of the 
Institute of Chinese Studies at the Universiti Tunku Abdul 
Rahman on 2 May 2014. Dr. Chin compared the nation-
building ideas of the founding father of modern China, Dr. 
Sun Yat Sen, and the founding father of Malaysia, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman. The research suggests that in the early 
stages, both Dr Sun and Tunku tended to promote a form of 
nationalism exclusively for one ethnic group to provoke a 
sense of rebellion against other imagined “foreign ethnics” 
inhabiting in the country. However, after forming a new 
nation, their idea had changed dramatically by accepting the 
nationality of ethnic minorities and recognizing their rights. In 
this case, both leaders had shifted to a form of state-nation, 
by abolishing the idea of national integration within a single 
ethnic, and embarking on a process of multicultural 
integration. During the national integration process, Dr Sun 
prefers assimilating all the ethnics into a single nation while 
Tunku prefers to conduct a relatively moderate way of 
integration through power sharing and cooperation among 
ethnic groups. Thus far, differences between the two 
statesmen’s ideas have contributed to two different paths of 
national integration for their nation respectively.  ◆ 
Assistant Professor and Head of Department of Chinese Studies, 
Institute of Chinese Studies 
& Head of Contemporary China Studies unit 
in Centre for Chinese Studies Research (CCSR), 
Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) 
Dr. Lu Peng, who obtained his PhD in Sociology from 
Tsinghua University in China, presented a seminar on 10 
June 2014. Mass incidents or collective actions have been 
rising in China in recent years. This study uses statistical 
modelling to study the sociology of collective action in China. 
The peak value of participants is the key indicator to measure 
or capture the potential power or influence of collective 
actions, and this peak can be predicted by constructing 
mathematical models. Outcomes of simulations indicate that 
exclusive and interest-based collective actions do have peaks 
while rule-based and moral-based ones have no peaks or 
limitation of participants. The lower the values of Jointness of 
Supply, the earlier peaks show up, and the smaller the peak 
values are. Ideal peaks can be solved by assuming that the 
group is completely homogeneous, and in the real world 
groups are heterogenous, which is why solving real peaks are 
needed. Real peaks have some forms of statistical 
relationships with jointness of supply, group heterogeneity, 
and their ideal peaks, which paves the way for predicting real 
peaks in collective actions. Solutions for real peaks are jointly 
provided by simulations and statistical models . ◆ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Lu Peng 
To promote academic exchange, the Institute 
of China Studies frequently organizes seminars 
and conferences, including international 
conferences. Also, the institute actively 
collaborates with domestic and foreign 
institution on various research projects. ◆ 
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           icsumal@gmail.com 
 
About ICS 
The Institute of China Studies (ICS) at the 
University of Malaya was established in 2004. 
It is the first academic institute devoted to the 
research on China in Malaysia, and it also 
acts as a think tank to serve the government, 
such as providing the government with policy 
suggestions on developing bilateral relations.   
 
The main mission of the Institute is to push for 
the academic and policy research on 
contemporary China. There are two focus 
areas: (1) the political, economic, and social 
changes of China since the Reform Era; and 
(2) the impact of China’s rise on Southeast 
Asia and the world. In addition, the institute 
will also pay attention to the studies of Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and other relevant 
areas. 
 
In addition, the Institute aims to foster the 
strategic research capacity on China in 
Malaysia, build a professional academic 
resource centre, and promote the 
understanding of China through various 
academic activities. Through these efforts, the 
Institute intends to become the frontier 
research institute in the region. 
Forthcoming International Conference:  
“Malaysia, China, and the Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century” 
including the United States, China, and Japan, 
as well as the pursuance of both similar and 
different agendas by these great powers in the 
region, complicate the political economy of 
Asia-Pacific significantly. Both Malaysia and 
China have to pay close attention to the 
regional dynamics of ASEAN and the wider 
Asia-Pacific and to adopt and adjust policy 
accordingly. In this sense, Malaysia-China 
relations also have to be understood from the 
wider context of Asia-Pacific dynamics.  
   
Therefore, it is pertinent to revisit, review, and 
assess Malaysia-China relations in this context 
of Asia-Pacific political economy in the year of 
the 40th anniversary of formal diplomatic ties. It 
is for this purpose that the Institute of China 
Studies organizes this conference. ◆ 
 
Conference Date: 29-30 October 2014 
Venue: Auditorium, Institute of Graduate 
Studies, University of Malaya. 
In 2014, Malaysia and China celebrate the 
40th anniversary of the formal establishment 
of diplomatic ties, which occurred in 1974, 
when the then Prime Minister Tun Abdul 
Razak visited Beijing. Since then, relationship 
between the two countries has progressed 
tremendously along different fields, including 
trade, investment, cultural and educational 
exchange, and diplomatic cooperation. 
Malaysia and China have also been 
successfully using bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral forms of cooperation to address 
common challenges and issues.  
 
On the other hand, Malaysia-China relations 
take place within the overall context of the 
regionalism of ASEAN as well as the dynamic 
Asia-Pacific political economy. Entering the 
21st century, Asia-Pacific remains one of the 
most economically vibrant regions in the 
world. Nevertheless, contentious regional 
issues remain in place to potentially derail the 
economic development of the region. The 
presence of a number of great powers, 
